Rapid growth in Asia's emerging economies has boosted export earnings of resource-rich economies over the past decade. Whether or not those high growth rates continue, how will structural changes in Asia alter the relative importance of their imports of primary products? This paper projects production and trade patterns of Africa and Latin America to 2030 under various growth and policy scenarios in Asia, using the GTAP model of the global economy.
Introduction
The evolution of the global economic landscape over the next two decades will have significant implications for resource rich regions, including Africa and Latin America. Rapid economic growth in emerging economies, especially in Asia, is shifting the global economic and industrial centre of gravity away from the north Atlantic, and globalization is causing trade to grow much faster than output. Together these forces are raising the importance of natural resource-poor Asian economies in world output, consumption and trade, and are increasing the demand for exports from natural resource-rich economies. This is a continuation of a process begun in Japan in the 1950s and followed by Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan from the late 1960s, then by other Southeast Asian countries, but more recently by the much more populous China and India. The earlier Northeast Asian group represents just 3 percent of the world's population, so its rapid industrial growth was accommodated by the rest of the world without much difficulty, including in markets for primary products. China and India, by contrast, account for more than two-fifths of humanity.
Their rapid and persistent industrialization therefore has far greater significance for primary product markets and thus for such things as food and energy security and greenhouse gas emissions globally. How markets and governments respond to these concerns could have non-trivial effects in both the emerging economies of Asia and their trading partners, including resource-rich Africa and Latin America. This paper focuses on the consequences for primary product markets of the prospective continuation of this latest and by far largest emergence of Asian industrialization.
Both development theory and historical experience provide guidance as to what to expect.
Economic growth over the two previous generations in East Asia, plus the newest generation's first decades of rapid industrialization, have been quite consistent with trade and development theory. To assist anticipating likely trends over the next two decades, Section 2 of the paper briefly summarizes that theory and the associated changes in sectoral and trade policies that tend to accompany rapid industrialization. We then use a global economy-wide model to project potential changes in the world economy to 2030, described in Section 3.
Results that emerge from the projections (assuming no policy changes) are summarized in Section 4 under two alternative assumptions: one in which growth rates for China and India are set fairly conservatively, and the second in which real GDP continues to grow rapidly in China and India (albeit slower than in the previous decade). The comparison between those two scenarios highlights the significance of rapid economic growth in one region for market participants in other regions of the world. The first of those baselines is then compared in Section 5 with two scenarios generated using alternative assumptions about (a) agricultural productivity growth rates in Africa and Latin America and (b) food trade policies in China and India. Section 6 discusses several caveats before the final section draws out key lessons and implications for African and Latin American natural resource-abundant economies.
What to expect from past experience
China and India, like Northeast Asia's earlier rapidly industrializing economies, are relatively natural resource-poor and densely populated. They are therefore highly complementary with relatively lightly populated and slower-growing economies that are well-endowed with agricultural land and/or mineral resources, according to the workhorse theory of comparative advantage developed in the 20 th century. That theory blends the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model, which assumes all factors of production are mobile between sectors, with the RicardoViner model which assumes some factors are sector-specific. Such a blend is provided by Krueger (1977) and explored further by Deardorff (1984) . They consider two tradable sectors each using intersectorally mobile labour plus one sector-specific factor (natural-resource capital or produced capital). Assuming that labour exhibits diminishing marginal product in each sector, and that there are no services or nontradables and no policy distortions, then at a given set of international prices the real wage in each economy is determined by the aggregate per worker endowment of natural-resource and produced capital. The commodity composition of a country's trade -that is, the extent to which a country is a net exporter of primary or industrial products -is determined by its endowment of natural relative to industrial capital compared with that ratio for the rest of the world. Leamer (1987) other tradable products, ceteris paribus. It would also boost national income and hence the demand for nontradables, which would cause mobile resources to move into the production of nontradable goods and services, further reducing farm and industrial production (Corden 1984) .
Domestic or foreign savings can be invested to enhance the stock and/or improve the quality not only of a country's produced capital but also of its economically exploitable stock of natural resources. Any such increase in the net stock of produced capital per worker will put upward pressure on real wages. That will encourage, in all sectors, the use of more labour-saving techniques and the development and/or importation of better technologies that are less labour intensive. Whether it boosts industrialization more than agricultural or other primary production will depend on the relative speed of sector-specific productivity growth that such R&D investments yield. Which types of investment would expand fastest in a freemarket setting depends on their expected rates of return. The more densely populated, natural resource-poor an open economy is, the greater the likelihood that the highest payoff would be in expanding stocks of capital (including technological knowledge) for non-primary sectors.
That gives rise to the Rybczynski effect, of pulling mobile resources (most notably labour) out of primary sectors. If there is also relatively rapid productivity growth in primary sectors (as Martin and Mitra (2001) have found to be the case historically), and especially if that productivity growth is labour-saving, this could push even more labour into non-primary sectors (Martin and Warr 1993) .
At early stages of development of a country with a relatively small stock of natural resources per worker, wages would be low and the country would have a comparative cost advantage in unskilled labour-intensive, standard-technology manufactures. Then as the stock of industrial capital grows, there would be a gradual move toward exporting manufactures that are relatively intensive in their use of physical capital, skills and knowledge. Natural resource-abundant economies, however, would invest more in capital specific to primary production and so would not develop a comparative advantage in manufacturing until a later stage of development, at which time their industrial exports would be relatively capital intensive.
The above theory of changing comparative advantages -which can also be used to explain shocks to that pattern from discovery-driven mining booms or major terms of trade changes imposed from the rest of the world -has been used successfully to explain the evolving trade patterns of Asia's resource-poor first-and second-generation industrializing economies and their resource-rich trading partners (see, e.g., Anderson and Smith 1981) . It has also explained the 20 th century evolution, for early-and later-industrializing countries, of the flying geese pattern of comparative advantage and then disadvantage in unskilled labourintensive manufactures as some rapidly growing economies expand their endowments of industrial capital per worker relative to the rest of the world -the classic example being clothing and textiles (Ozawa 2009 ).
The evolving pattern of a country's production and trade specialization depends on its changes not only in its comparative advantages but also in its sectoral and trade policies. If a developing economy that had been protecting its manufacturers from import competition chose to lower those barriers, there would be two sets of consequences. One is that the country would be better able to specialize in those manufacturing activities in which it had its strongest comparative advantages and to nimbly alter its product mix as those advantages evolved. The other is that its real exchange rate would depreciate, allowing other tradable sectors such as agriculture to expand production and net exports. If the economy had been taxing exports of primary products, a lowering of these would allow domestic production of those goods to grow. And if a dual or multiple exchange rate system was replaced by a market-driven system, that reform would effectively remove that implicit form of trade taxation (Dervis, de Melo and Robinson 1981) and thus amplify the above effects.
According to a recent multi-country empirical study of policy indicators, precisely those types of policy reforms have taken place in many developing countries over the past three decades. More specifically, policy-induced distortions to the domestic prices of agricultural goods relative to other tradable product prices had discriminated heavily against many developing country farmers prior to the 1980s, but they have since been greatly reduced (Anderson 2009 ). This is particularly so in Asia, but also in Africa and Latin America. 1 Those new policy indicators for Asia shed light on something that has perplexed agricultural trade analysts for some time, which is why self-sufficiency in farm products has fallen so little in China and India despite their very strong growth in production and exports of manufactures (and of certain tradable services in the case of India). Those indicators also reveal that such emerging economies often go beyond removing agricultural disincentives, in that they then increasingly assist their farmers relative to producers in other sectors as industrialization proceeds -and at an earlier stage of economic development the weaker the country's comparative advantage in farm products (Anderson 2010) . This suggests the need to consider such a possibility in market projection studies.
Modeling approach
Given the interdependence between sectors of growing economies, an economy-wide model of the world's national markets is needed to project future trends in primary product markets.
In this study we employ the GTAP model of the global economy (Hertel 1997 ) and the latest available Version 8.1 of the GTAP database which is calibrated to 2007 levels of production, consumption, trade and protection (Narayanan, Aguiar and McDougall 2012) . The standard GTAP model is perhaps the most widely used CGE model for economy-wide global market analysis, in part due to its robust and explicit assumptions; and 2007 is an ideal base period for a long-term projection because it immediately precedes the recent period of temporary spikes in food and fuel prices and the global financial crisis and recession.
In its simplest form, the model assumes perfect competition and constant returns to scale in production. The functional forms are nested constant elasticities of substitution (CES) production functions. Land and other natural resources, labour (skilled and unskilled), and produced physical capital substitute for one another in a value added aggregate, and composite intermediate inputs substitute for value-added at the next CES level in fixed proportions. Land is specific to agriculture in the GTAP database, and is mobile amongst alternative agricultural uses over this projection period, according to a Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) which, through a revenue function, transforms land from one use to another. In the modified version of the GTAP model we use, natural resources, including coal, oil, gas and other minerals, are specific to the sector in which they are mined. Aggregate national employment of each productive factor is fixed in the standard macro-economic closure, although we use exogenous projections to model changes in factor availability over time. Labour and produced capital are assumed to be mobile across all uses within a country, but immobile internationally, in the long-run model closure adopted.
On the demand side there is a national representative household whose expenditure is governed by a Cobb-Douglas aggregate utility function which allocates net national expenditures across private, government, and saving activities. Government demand across composite goods is determined by a Cobb-Douglas assumption (fixed budget shares). Private household demand is represented by a Constant Difference of Elasticities (CDE) functional form, which has the virtue of capturing the non-homothetic nature of private household demands, calibrated to replicate a vector of own-price and income elasticities of demand (Hertel et al. 2008) . In projecting to 2030, we modify these target income elasticities for food crops, 2 since the elasticity for food in developing countries tends to fall with income growth.
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Bilateral international trade flows are handled through the Armington (1969) specification by which products are differentiated by country of origin. These Armington elasticities are the same across countries but are sector-specific, and the import-import elasticities have been estimated at the disaggregated GTAP commodity level (Hertel et al. 2007 ). For present purposes, where we are dealing with long-term changes, we follow the typical modelling practise of doubling the short-to-medium term Armington elasticities. The national balance of trade is determined by the relationship between national investment and savings and investment can be allocated in the GTAP model either in response to rates of return, with capital markets kept in equilibrium, or in fixed shares across countries so that it moves in line with global savings. For present purposes we allow savings and investment to respond to changes in rates of return.
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The GTAP version 8.1 database divides the world into 134 countries/country groups, and each economy into 57 sectors. In the present study we aggregate these to 35 countries and regions and to 34 sectors but, to aid digestion of model outputs, we further aggregate these regions and sectors when reporting results.
Projections to 2030 assuming no policy changes
We project the GTAP database's 2007 baseline for the world economy to provide an initial pair of baselines for 2030 by assuming the 2007 trade-related policies of each country do not change. However, over the 23-year period we assume that national real GDP, population, unskilled and skilled labour, capital, agricultural land, and extractable mineral resources (oil, gas, coal and other minerals) grow at exogenously set rates.
Core projection
Our first baseline reflects relatively conservative growth assumptions for China and India and also for global primary total factor productivity (TFP) growth. In the second baseline, growth estimates for China and India and for global primary TFP are more optimistic, albeit still slower than in the past decade. 5 GDP, capital and population growth rates are based on estimates from the World Bank and CEPII (Fouré et al. 2012) , while for projections of skilled and unskilled labour growth rates, we draw on Chappuis and Walmsley (2011) . We estimate The growth rates for key exogenous variables in the core scenario are summarized in Appendix Table A. 1. This baseline forms the conservative 2030 scenario against which others are compared. This core baseline has growth rates for real GDP, skilled labour and capital stocks in China and India that are one-quarter below those of the faster Asian growth scenario. That latter scenario also assumes global TFP growth in all primary sectors is faster by 1 percentage point annually.
The differences across regions in rates of growth of factor endowments and total factor productivity, and the fact that sectors differ in their relative factor intensities and their 5 For an earlier study exploring some impacts of higher productivity growth assumptions for China and India using the2001 GTAP version 6 database as a starting point, see Dimaranan et al. (2007) .
share of GDP, ensure that the structures of production, consumption and trade across sectors within countries, and also between countries, is going to be very different in 2030 than in
2007.
In particular, developing economies (especially the faster-growing ones of Asia) will account for considerably larger shares of the projected global economy over the next two Table A .2).
When global value added (based on producer expenditure) is broken down by sector, the changes are more striking. China by 2030 is projected to return to its supremacy as the world's top producing country not only of primary products but also of manufactures. The global manufacturing share remains close to 4 percent for LA and rises to just under 1 percent for SSA, while the global share of overall GDP rises from 5.1 to 6.3 percent for LA and from 1.1 to 2.5 percent for SSA. This reflects the projected rise in importance of (especially nonagricultural) primary production in LA and SSA (Table 1) . As a result, LA and SSA exports of non-farm primary products increase their combined share of global exports from 18 to 29 percent, while their combined farm product exports' share of world trade rises from 15 to 18 percent (Table 2) . Meanwhile, the Asia region doubles its share of world agricultural and food imports, while increasing its share of other primary imports by more than a third by 2030 ( Table 2) .
As for the sectoral shares of national trade, the projected consequences for LA differ considerably from those for SSA. SSA is a net importer of farm products, and that dependence increases slightly over the projection period as low African incomes and thus food consumption levels rise, whereas LA is a large net exporter of agricultural goods whose share of total LA exports rises from 21 to 24 percent between 2007 and 2030. As for other primary goods, they account for two-thirds of SSA's 2007 exports and that becomes only slightly larger by 2030, while in LA their share was only one-fifth in 2007 but it is projected to rise above one-third by 2030 (Table 3) .
These boosts to primary product exports in LA necessarily are at the relative expense of their exports of manufactures and services, which suffer the Dutch disease problem associated with a boom in primary sector exports, in this case resulting mainly from Asia's rapid industrialization. 6 That is, while LA's very strong comparative advantage in farming is projected to be maintained and its moderately strong comparative advantage in mining increases, its comparative disadvantages in manufactures and services are projected to deepen. For SSA the changes in comparative advantage are more modest because its exports are already highly specialized in non-food primary products (Table 4 ).
The sectoral structure of imports changes relatively little for LA and SSA, but it changes very considerably for China and South Asia under our initial assumption that trade policies do not change over the projection period. In particular, the share of farm products in imports doubles for South Asia and trebles for China, and the shares of other primary products in imports also rise, nearly doubling in China (Table 5) . Whether in fact China and India allow such an increase in food import dependence is a moot point, to be taken up below.
The consequences for bilateral trade shares of these changes in total trade are summarized in Figure 1 . The shares of farm exports going to Asian developing countries are projected to increase by more than one and a half times for LA and by two and a half times for SSA, almost all at the expense of exports to high-income countries rather than to other developing countries. The changes in importance of developing Asia for non-farm primary products from SSA and LA are not quite as dramatic for farm products, but by 2030 it will be the destination for more than one-third of LA's and two-fifths of SSA's exports of those products, having been around one-quarter in 2007. Clearly this represents a huge change in the direction of primary product trade in just one generation for both LA and SSA.
These changes also mean that food and agricultural self-sufficiency in South Asia and
China is projected to fall 6 to 9 percentage points by 2030 if there are no changes in policies to alter these market forces (Table 6 ). Brazil is the main country in LA to see its selfsufficiency rise, and South Africa also is projected to become a significantly greater exporter of farm products (as are Europe and North America). For many developing countries though, their food self-sufficiency is projected to fall at least a little in the wake of Asia's economic growth.
Self-sufficiency is a poor indicator of food security, however. A more meaningful indicator is real per capita private consumption of agricultural and processed food products by households. Between 2007 and 2030 real per capita food consumption is projected to rise by 51 percent for developing countries, and even more for China and South Asia (first column of Table 7 ). Even in relatively well-fed LA the increase over the projection period more than one-third, and in SSA the rise is two-thirds. These are major improvements in food consumption per capita. Even if income distribution were to worsen in emerging economies over the next two decades, virtually all developing country regions could expect to be much better fed by 2030 according to this baseline scenario with relatively conservative growth.
The rise in grain consumption is especially great in China because of their expanding demand for livestock products, most of which would continue to be produced domestically.
So even though China's share of the world's direct grain consumption by households grows little, its share of grain consumed indirectly grows significantly, implying on-going growth in the market for grain (and soybean) exports from LA especially.
Projection with faster Asian growth
The above projection is but one of myriad possibilities. Here we explore the implications of an alternative set of assumptions that include faster Asian growth, while in Section 5 we consider projections that include policy changes and compare the economic consequences with those summarized for the conservative 2030 scenario above.
An alternative baseline that seemed perhaps more likely a couple of years ago assumes one-third faster growth in GDP, skilled labour and capital stock in China and India, which is still below their rates of growth during the past decade. Taking into account those economies' actual growth rates during 2007-12, this faster-growth scenario implies GDP growth rates of around 7 percent per year for China and 6 percent for India for the remainder of the projection period (2013-30). The purpose of presenting this alternative is to show how much greater would be the changes in the composition and direction of trade for LA and SSA if something closer to Asia's growth rates of the past couple of decades were to persist for another two decades. In this alternative scenario we also assume one percentage point faster annual TFP growth in primary sectors globally, in response to faster growth in demand for those sectors' output by China and India. These amendments to Asian growth and global TFP growth lead to real global export prices in 2030 being only 3 instead of 11 percent above those in 2007 for farm products, and 5 below instead of 9 percent above 2007 levels for other primary products.
Not surprisingly, the faster Asian growth scenario leads to a substantial increase in the importance of this region to total exports of resource-rich economies, with the share of total LA exports in 2030 going to Asia increasing from 30 to 38 percent, while for SSA the increase is from 50 to 57 percent of its total 2030 exports. Although overall developing country agricultural self-sufficiency stays constant in this faster growth scenario, the agricultural self-sufficiency rates increase for the LA and SSA regions by 3 to 5 percentage points, as shown in Table 6 . The share of developing Asia in world imports of food and agricultural products increases from 20 to 40 percent, as shown in Table 8 , with both LA and SSA increasing their share of global exports of these products. Despite increasing their exports to the Asian region, LA and SSA are projected to have further increased levels of household consumption of farm products (Table 7 ), in part due to the primary product agricultural TFP in this scenario, but also due to their higher incomes as the Asian region grows more rapidly.
Alternative growth projections to 2030 with policy changes
In this section, we compare our conservative growth baseline with two alternative policy scenarios. One assumes that Latin America and SSA choose to invest more in public agricultural R&D in response to the growth in Asia's import demand for farm products. The other assumes China and India restrict imports of key foodgrains, in response to concerns about rising food import dependence.
Increased agricultural productivity in LA and SSA
In the first of the alternative policy scenarios, we modify the conservative growth baseline assumption to reflect an increase in agricultural TFP in Latin America and Africa. It has been shown in general that the marginal returns from boosting such levels of public investment are extremely high (Hurley, Rao and Pardey 2014) . The evidence from Brazil is particularly compelling: during the 1980s and 1990s Brazil invested more than four times as intensely as China in public agricultural R&D as a percent of national agricultural GDP. It is therefore not surprising that Brazil's output of both crop and livestock products have more than doubled since the early 1990s, and its food self-sufficiency has been boosted commensurately. And by biasing that research toward labour-saving technologies, that investment also helped farmers adjust to rising rural wages -something that is becoming more pressing also in China as the supply of under-employed labour in rural areas shrinks (Zhang, Yang and Wang 2011) . We assume that increased agricultural R&D in LA and SSA leads to agricultural TFP being 1 percentage point per annum higher in the LA and SSA regions over the projected period than in the core conservative growth scenario. (Table 8 ). The agricultural productivity boost significantly raises self-sufficiency rates in both regions, indeed substantially more than did the faster Asia growth scenario, as shown in Table 6 ; and it raises real household consumption of food and agricultural products in Asia (Table 7) , consistent with Asia recently taking a greater interest in farm productivity growth in SSA and LA.
Increased agricultural import protection in China and India
The decline in self-sufficiency in farm products by 2030 for China from 97 to 88 percent and for South Asia from 100 to 94 percent in the core scenario (Table 6 ) may prompt a trade policy response. Specifically, it may well lead China and India to follow the earlierindustrializing Northeast Asian countries in imposing import restrictions on key food grains and, in the interest of boosting farm incomes to reduce the yawning urban-rural income gap, imposing import restrictions on meat and milk products (but not on coarse grains and oilseed products required for animal feedstuffs). Indeed there are signs already of such a rise in agricultural supports for farmers in these two countries (and in Indonesia, see Figure 3 ).
If such restrictions were in the form of tariff equivalents severe enough to eliminate imports of those selected products in 2030, then according to our GTAP modelling such a trade policy response by China and India raises substantially the share of imports of agricultural products that are not protected ( Table 9 ). As resources move toward rice, wheat and livestock production, self-sufficiency would fall further for crops that provide inputs into livestock feedstuffs, and also for other crops. The tariff equivalents of such import restrictions in our simulations range from 115 percent for wheat to 255 percent for red meats for China and between 136 and 326 percent for those products in India. These are well above bound out-of-quota tariffs in numerous cases (compare the last two columns for China and for India in Table 9 ) and so would be inconsistent with WTO commitments under international law. Moreover, such a policy response would impose a burden on Chinese and
Indian households that are net buyers of those grain, meat and milk products, because (Table 4 (a) and (e)). However for SSA, that increased protection leads to little change in the relative importance of exports of farm products to Asia. For the South Asian region there is almost no impact on overall agricultural self-sufficiency, while for China its overall agricultural self-sufficiency would decline only about half as much from its 2007 rate as in the core scenario (Table 6 ). Not surprisingly, Asia's overall household consumption of agricultural and food products is reduced slightly by the increased Asian protection (Table 7) .
Caveats
As with the results from all other economy-wide projections modelling, it is necessary to keep in mind numerous qualifications. One is that for the core projection we have assumed trade costs in the form of transport and communications costs do not change, even though they have been falling steadily during the current wave of globalization (Arvis et al. 2012) .
A second assumption is that we have aggregated the model into just 34 sectors or product groups. This leads to gross underestimation of the extent to which firms can take advantage of intra-industry trade through exploiting the increasing opportunities to lower costs through fragmenting the production process into ever-more pieces whose location is footloose (Feenstra 1998 , Baldwin 2012 ).
Third, we have assumed constant returns to scale and perfect competition rather than allowing firms to enjoy increasing returns and some degree of monopoly power for their differentiated products. This too leads to underestimates of the changes associated with production and trade growth (Krugman 2009 ). Sixth, we do not constrain trade imbalances over time. However, in the initial database, these are large for countries such as the United States and China and some argue that these imbalances are unlikely to be sustained over time (for example, see Feldstein 2011) . Given that the large and rapidly growing Chinese economy is an important driver of changes in the global economy, in an earlier study we tested the sensitivity of key projection results to determine how they might change in an alternative scenario where China's trade surplus is constrained (Anderson and Strutt 2012) . An associated issue is that if China reduces its savings rate over time as it becomes wealthier, this will reduce the trade surplus for China and it was this mechanism that we used to dampen the trade surplus. 9 The importance of China in global exports will reduce if it is not able to continue huge trade surpluses (Anderson and Strutt 2012) .
Finally, the standard GTAP model used here is comparative static. It therefore does not measure the additional dynamic consequences of economic growth and trade policy changes. Dynamic effects of greater openness arise in numerous ways. One of the more important is through encouragement of the more-efficient firms to take over from the less efficient in each country (Melitz 2003 , Bernard et al. 2007 , Melitz and Ottaviano 2008 .
Another way is through multinational firms sharing technologies and knowledge across countries within the firm (Markusen 2002) .
Offshoring is yet another mechanism through which heterogeneous firms are affected, including via re-locating from small to larger nations (Baldwin and Okuba 2011) . It may also alter the political economy of protection, providing stronger opposition from new exporters and thus leading to more opening up of economies (Baldwin 2012) .
Policy implications and conclusions
Should relatively rapid economic growth in Asia and to a lesser extent in other developing countries continue to characterize world economic development as suggested above, Source: Derived from the authors' GTAP Model results Prop'n of total imports 13 10 9 8 * Indicates sectors subject to the self-sufficiency policy.
Source: Authors' GTAP Model results 
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